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CROSSING RACIAL BOUNDARIES:
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE ROOTS OF RACIAL BIAS IN
CAPITAL SENTENCING WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS





In 1976, the United States Supreme Court assumed in Gregg v.
Georgia and companion cases1 that the reformed capital statutes of
Georgia, Florida, and Texas would remedy the ills, including the risk
of racial bias in sentencing that made the application of the death pen-
alty unconstitutional according to Furman v. Georgia.2 Yet studies of
sentencing outcomes, notably research that expressly focused on the
states whose statutes the Gregg Court endorsed, revealed that the per-
nicious influence of race in capital sentencing lingered on, most con-
spicuously so, in the racial boundary crossing black-defendant/white-
victim (B/W) cases.3
Consistent with the mounting evidence of racial bias, in 1986 the
U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in Turner v. Murray4 the danger
* Northeastern University. We would like to express our appreciation to Michael E.
Antonio, Associate Research Scientist, College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University, for
his assistance in the preparation of the tables included in this Article. This research was sup-
ported by a grant from the Law and Social Sciences Program of the National Science Founda-
tion, SES-9013252.
** Indiana University
*** Kent State University
1. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3. See WILLIAM J. BOWERS & GLENN L. PIERCE, ARBITRARINESS AND DISCRIMINATION
UNDER POsT-FURMAN CAPITAL STATUTES, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY (1980) (demonstrating
racial disparities in capital sentencing under the Gregg-approved statutes of Georgia, Florida,
and Texas, as well as for Ohio's statute). DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990) is the most rigorous demonstra-
tion of the influence of race on sentencing outcomes in black-defendant/white-victim capital
cases. See also SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990).
4. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
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that both conscious and unconscious racial sentiments are likely to
influence jurors' sentencing decisions in capital cases, and it identified
the boundary-crossing black-defendant/white-victim cases as the ones
in which jurors' racial attitudes are especially apt to confound the sen-
tencing decision. The Court reasoned:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital
sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial
prejudice to operate but remain undetected .... [A] juror who
believes that blacks are violence prone or morally inferior might
well be influenced by that belief in deciding whether petitioner's
crime involved [such] aggravating factors .... Such a juror might
also be less favorably inclined toward [a] petitioner's evidence of
mental disturbance as a mitigating circumstance. More subtle, less
consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a juror's deci-
sion .... Fear of blacks, which could easily be stirred up by the
violent facts of petitioner's crime, might incline a juror to favor the
death penalty.5
The Court emphasized that the sentencing determination in such
cases is especially vulnerable to the influence of racial attitudes and
prejudices because
in a capital sentencing proceeding before a jury, the jury is called
upon to make a highly subjective, unique, individualized judgment
regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves ....
[W]e are convinced that such discretion gives greater opportunity
for racial prejudice to operate than is present when the jury is re-
stricted to fact-finding .... [A]s we see it, the risk of racial bias at
sentencing hearings is of an entirely different order, because the de-
cisions that sentencing jurors must make involve far more subjective
judgments than when they are deciding guilt or innocence.6
The remedy, according to Turner, was to be found in jury selection.
The Court stated, "We hold that a capital defendant accused of an
interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the
race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias."' 7
Despite its recognition that the capital sentencing decision was es-
pecially vulnerable to biasing racial influences in black-defendant/
white-victim cases, the Court denied relief a year later in the B/W case
of McCleskey v. Kemp, 8 in which statistical confirmation of the risk of
racial bias in such cases was unrivaled. 9 McCleskey's death sentence
was a product of the same evidently flawed system that sentenced Tur-
5. Id. at 35.
6. Id. at 33-34, 36, 38.
7. Id. at 37.
8. 478 U.S. 282 (1987).
9. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 3, at 407. The U.S. Supreme Court conceded the validity of
Baldus's statistical findings in McCleskey. 478 U.S. at 282 n.7.
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ner to death. The crimes were virtually contemporaneous.1 0 Yet the
Court denied, albeit narrowly (5-4), that McCleskey's risk was suffi-
cient for relief."a It was not the risk, however, but the remedies, that
distinguished these two cases. The Court was willing to require voir
dire questioning but unwilling to abandon the death penalty in such
cases. Ironically, the McCleskey Court cited its Turner ruling to show
that it had taken the needed steps to counter racial bias in black-de-
fendant/white-victim capital cases, 12 McCleskey's fate notwithstand-
ing.
Has the legacy of racism in black-defendant/white-victim cases been
purged? Has the Court's ruling in Turner made the difference? Is
voir dire questioning about race in B/W cases the answer? We address
these questions with the data of the Capital Jury Project.
II. THE CAPITAL JURY PROJECT
The Capital Jury Project (CJP) has collected a wealth of informa-
tion about jury decision making from in-depth interviews with jurors
who served on capital trials around the nation. States were chosen for
the study to represent the principal variations in capital sentencing
statutes. 13 Juror interviews were conducted in Alabama, California,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Car-
olina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
10. According to the court opinions in these cases, Turner's crime was committed on July 12,
1978, and McCleskey's crime was committed on May 13, 1978. Turner, 476 U.S. at 28-29; Mc-
Cleskey v. State, 263 S.E.2d 146, 147 (1979).
11. McCleskey, 478 U.S. at 308-09. After acknowledging that there is "some risk of racial
prejudice influencing a jury's decision in a criminal case," the Court cited Turner as indicating
"at what point that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable." Id. (citing Turner, 476 U.S. at
36 n.8). It then found that McCleskey failed to meet that critical level of risk: "McCleskey asks
us to accept the likelihood allegedly shown by the Baldus study as the constitutional measure of
an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice influencing capital sentencing decisions. This we decline
to do." Id.
12. In McCleskey, the Court explained: "Because of the risk that the factor of race may enter
the criminal justice process, we have engaged in 'unceasing efforts' to eradicate racial prejudice
from our criminal justice system." Id. The Court then listed protections, including change of
venue "when there is widespread bias in the community," prohibition against racially biased
prosecutorial jury selection and arguments before the jury, and questioning jurors as to bias
"when there is a significant likelihood that racial bias may influence a jury." Id. The Court
concluded, with respect to capital cases, "Finally, in a capital sentencing hearing, a defendant
convicted of an interracial murder is entitled to such questioning without regard to the circum-
stances of the particular case." Id. (citing Turner, 476 U.S. at 28).
13. The sample includes states with "threshold," "balancing," and "directed" statutory guide-
lines for sentencing discretion. It also includes states with "traditional" and "narrowing" defini-
tions of capital murder and states in which the jury decision is binding and those in which the
judge can override the jury recommendation. Further details about sampling can be found in
William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and a Preview of Early Findings,
70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1077-79 (1995).
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Within each state, researchers selected twenty to thirty capital trials,
roughly half of which resulted in the death penalty and half that re-
sulted in a life sentence (or whatever alternative term of imprison-
ment applied under state law). Jurors were chosen randomly from
those cases in an attempt to interview four jurors per trial. 14  The
questionnaire used for these in-depth interviews required an average
of three and one-half hours to administer. It probed issues, such as
what assumptions jurors made when deciding the penalty, how and
when they made their decisions, what factors they considered, and
their understanding of the jury instructions. Interviews were com-
pleted with 1,198 jurors from 353 trials in fourteen states. Additional
information about CJP research design, methodology, and findings
can be found on the CJP website at www.cjp.neu.edu. 15
These interviews make it possible to examine the role of jurors'
race-both the race of the individual juror and the racial composition
of the jury-in the capital sentencing decision. They also make it pos-
sible to see how the influence of the race of the jury and jurors may
operate in black-defendant/white-victim cases. The large number of
cases from which jurors have been interviewed provides a sizable sam-
ple of mixed race juries, and, the interviewing target of four jurors per
case yields enough jurors of both races to permit reliable comparisons
between black and white jurors who served on the same B/W cases
and, hence, were exposed to exactly the same evidence and argu-
ments. Comparing the thinking and decision making of black and
white jurors from the same black-defendant/white-victim cases en-
sures that observed differences by race of juror will not be due to
differences in the crimes, defendants, or victims involved.
III. EARLIER RACE-RELATED FINDINGS
Racial bias in capital sentencing was first examined extensively with
the CJP data in Death Sentencing in Black and White, presented at a
conference on Race Crime and the Constitution held by the University
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law in 2001.16 In that ear-
14. Fewer than four jurors were interviewed in some cases owing to difficulties locating jurors
or obtaining their consent, and more than four jurors were interviewed in some cases to get
additional information about issues raised in earlier interviews or to more nearly equalize the
number of interviews with jurors from life and death cases within a state.
15. For a complete list of publications reporting CP findings, which is periodically updated
and includes the full text of some articles, see http://www.cjp.neu.edu (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
The most detailed discussion of the research methodology can be found in Bowers, supra note
13, at 1077-79.
16. William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of
the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171 (2001).
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lier research with these data, we found conspicuous evidence of racial
influence in sentencing in the critical black-defendant/white-victim
cases in which Turner warned of the dangers of both conscious and
unconscious racism in jurors' decision making.
With respect to jury composition, we found two distinct and sub-
stantial patterns of racial influence in the black-defendant/white-vic-
tim cases: "white male dominance" and "black male presence
effects." First, the dominance of white males on the jury was strongly
associated with the imposition of a death sentence. Death sentences
were more than twice as common in cases with five or more, as com-
pared to those with four or fewer, white male jurors. Secondly, the
presence of a black male on the jury was strongly associated with the
imposition of a life sentence. Death sentences were far less common
in cases with one or more black male jurors, as compared to those
with no black male jurors. 17 These striking race-linked differences
associated with jury composition are shown in Table 1.18
TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED IN 74
BLACK-DEFENDANT/WHITE-VICTIM CAPITAL TRIALS SEPARATELY
FOR NUMBER OF WHITE MALE, WHITE FEMALE, BLACK MALE,
AND BLACK FEMALE JURORS
WM a # Death% WF# Death % BM# Death% BF# Death%
0-3 35.3 0-3 54.2 0 71.9 0 55.5
4 23.1 4 50.0 1 42.9 1 61.9
5 63.2 5 61.5 2 36.4 2 60.0
6+ 78.3 6+ 52 3+ _b 3+ 35.7
Abbreviations: W white, B black, M male, F female.
Percent omitted as unreliable when the number of trials drops below 10.
Furthermore, the CJP data show that in the black defendant/white
victim cases, black and white jurors became polarized on punish-
ment-whites for death and blacks for life-over the course of the
trial. Even before the punishment stage of the trial, black and white
jurors' punishment stands diverged more in these interracial than in
intraracial cases. As the trial proceeded, this difference became con-
siderably more pronounced. At the guilt phase, whites were three
times more likely than blacks to take a pro-death stand on punishment
(42.3% versus 14.7%). After sentencing instructions, they were four
times more likely to do so (58.5% versus 15.2%). By the first vote on
17. Id. at 192 tbl. 1.
18. Table adapted from Bowers et al., supra note 16.
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punishment, the differential between white and black jurors reached
more than seven to one (67.3% versus 9.1%). 19
This progressive divergence of black and white jurors' stands on
punishment during the trial raises the question of what they may have
seen differently in these interracial cases and how such differences
may have become exacerbated over the course of the trial. The CJP
data reveal differences of perspective between black and white jurors
in three kinds of punishment related considerations: lingering doubt
about the defendant's guilt, impressions of the defendant's remorse-
fulness, and perceptions of the defendant's future dangerousness. 20
First, black jurors were far more likely than their white counterparts
to have lingering doubts about the defendant's guilt. They were gen-
erally less willing to believe that the capital sentencing process is error
free; they were more concerned than white jurors about the possibility
that the jury made mistakes in reaching the punishment decision.
These doubts arose during the guilt stage of the trial and were mani-
fest in jurors' thinking about the defendant's responsibility and moti-
vation for the crime. This pattern is consistent with other studies
showing that blacks are far less likely than whites to trust the criminal
justice system.2' Given the sordid history in the United States of all-
white male juries, sheriff's posies, and lynchings associated with black-
on-white killings, it is not surprising to find that black jurors' mistrust
is pronounced in interracial B/W cases.
Second, black jurors were much more likely than their white coun-
terparts in these cases to see the defendant as remorseful. Feelings
that the defendant deserved mercy also divided black and white jurors
in these cases. It may be that black jurors are more sensitive to subtle
19. Id. at 199 tbl. 2.
20. See id. at 205-21 tbls. 3-5 for a detailed presentation of this evidence.
21. Concerning African Americans' mistrust of the police, see W.S. Wilson Huang & Michael
S. Vaughn, Support and Confidence: Public Attitudes Toward the Police, in AMERICANS VIEW
CRIME AND JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 31-33 (Tnothy J. Flanagan &
Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996) (citing a 1993 USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll showing that 74%
of whites, but only 48% of blacks, rated their attitude toward the police as good); J.R. Lasley,
The Impact of the Rodney King Incident on Citizen Attitudes Toward Police, 3 POLICING & SOC'Y
245 (1994) (finding that African Americans' perception of police fairness after the beating of
Rodney King decreased much more than did that of other racial groups); P.A.J. Waddington &
Quentin Braddock, "Guardians" or "Bullies"? Perceptions of the Police Amongst Adolescent
Black, White, and Asian Boys, 2 POLICING & Soc'Y 31 (1991). Concerning African Americans'
mistrust of the courts, see, for example, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 124 (1996); NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, How THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 22 (1999),
available at http://www.ncsconline.org/wcpublications/ResAmPTCPublicViewsCrtsPub.pdf
(last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
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indications of black defendants' sorrow or remorse22 and believing
that the defendant is sorry may, in turn, encourage black jurors to feel
that the defendant deserves mercy. By contrast, if white jurors do not
perceive remorse on the part of black defendants, they might be less
willing to grant mercy.
Third, white jurors were more likely than their black counterparts
to see the defendant as dangerous in the interracial cases. Both black
and white jurors in these cases reported that a great deal of discussion
during punishment deliberations focused on the defendant's likely
dangerousness. But white jurors believed that, in the absence of a
death sentence, such defendants will usually be back on the streets far
sooner than do black jurors. This may, in part, explain why they were
especially likely to stress the defendant's dangerousness as a reason
for the death penalty. For their part, black jurors were less willing to
concede that the defendant was dangerous or to believe that such of-
fenders soon return to society if not given the death penalty. They
were also conspicuous in rejecting the defendant's possible dangerous-
ness in deciding to vote for life or death. Perhaps their reticence was a
reaction to pressure they felt from white jurors to make dangerous-
ness the rationale for a final death verdict.
What is more, these differences of perspective on aggravating and
mitigating considerations between black and white jurors were most
pronounced between the males of each race.23 Thus, black males
were the most likely, and white males were the least likely, to have
lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt, chiefly about the extent of
the defendant's involvement or responsibility for the crime. Again,
black males were the most likely, and white males the least likely, to
see the defendant as remorseful and to identify with the defendant's
situation or that of his family. And, on the flip side, white males were
the most likely, and black males the least likely, to see the defendant
as dangerous and to believe that he would be released from prison
soon if not given the death penalty. No doubt these differences of
perspective between the males of the two races contribute in various
ways to the observed differences in sentencing outcomes by jury racial
composition-to the "white male dominance" and "black male pres-
ence" effects shown in Table 1.
22. According to Scott Sundby, remorse is more broadly interpreted by jurors to encompass
acknowledgment of some degree of responsibility for the offense. See Scott Sundby, The Capital
Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1557 (1998).
23. Bowers et al., supra note 16, at 233 tbl. 7.
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These findings call for a better understanding of the role of jurors'
race and jury's racial composition in racial boundary-crossing capital
cases. More particularly, this research raises two related questions:
(1) how does both the race and gender of individual jurors, especially
black and white male jurors, contribute to the divergent perspectives
they bring or develop in response to the same evidence and arguments
at trial; and (2) how does the racial composition of the jury, especially
the numbers of black and white males on the jury, influence the way
in which these perspectives play out in jury deliberations and decision
making? The challenge of answering these questions has led us to
undertake this further examination of the available CJP data for a
closer look at race-linked perceptions and perspectives in black-defen-
dant/white-victim cases with mixed-race juries. 24 The findings of this
further inquiry recommend an alternative to jury selection, as pre-
scribed by Turner, if we are to continue using the death penalty in
interracial cases.
IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT RACE-LINKED PERCEPTIONS
AND PERSPECTIVES
The analysis that follows is divided into two sections. In the first
section, we examine jurors' responses to structured interview ques-
tions to identify differences in jurors' perspectives on the crime and
the defendant and to assess their receptivity to evidence and argu-
ments of aggravation and mitigation. Our purpose is to see how the
race-linked differences already uncovered come about, in order to un-
derstand their roots or underpinnings. In the second section, we draw
upon respondents' narrative accounts of their experiences as capital
jurors to elucidate the process of jury deliberations and decision mak-
ing and to see how the dominance of white males and the presence of
black males influence the process.
A. Race- and Gender-Linked Perspectives: Structured Questions
We now turn to how black and white male and female jurors who
served on B/W cases differ in the ways they see the same crime and
the same defendant and to how their receptivity to the same aggravat-
ing and mitigating considerations may differ. For this purpose, we
compare the responses of white male (WM), white female ('AF),
black male (BM), and black female (BF) jurors from the twenty-five
24. This challenge has also led to an extension of the CJP that will focus exclusively on capital
cases with mixed-race juries in which we are able to interview jurors of both races. The findings
of this new research, however, are still several years in the offing.
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black-defendant/white-victim cases in which we interviewed both
black and white jurors. Subdividing these jurors by race and gender
leaves us with relatively small numbers of jurors in each race/gender
category: white males (WM=30), white females (WF=25), black males
(BM=15), and black females (BF=19).25
The small numbers of jurors in the respective race/gender catego-
ries from these twenty-five black-defendant/white-victim cases means
that only quite sizable differences will be statistically reliable indica-
tions of true differences in the broader population of capital jurors of
different races and genders who served on black-defendant/white-vic-
tim cases. Accordingly, we have employed a heuristic "20% rule" in
selecting statistical differences for presentation; that is, a percentage
difference between blacks and whites must reach twenty percentage
points for the difference to be considered. The 20% rule has the fol-
lowing three specific applications:
1. Overall race difference: Both males and females of one race are
above or below their counterparts of the other race by twenty per-
centage points.
2. Conditional race difference: A difference between blacks and
whites of one gender exceeds a difference between blacks and
whites of the other gender by twenty percentage points.
3. Specific race difference: A given race/gender category is twenty
percentage points above or below each of the three other race/
gender categories.
Differences that meet at least one of these three criteria appear in
Tables 2 through 4 below, 26 and each is tested for statistical signifi-
cance by a procedure appropriate to the type of difference.27
25. The numbers of jurors on which percentages are based in the statistical tabulations that
follow generally fall below these figures, owing to the failure of some jurors to respond to all
questions.
26. The overall, conditional, and specific differences are not mutually exclusive. Thus, in Ta-
ble 3, two of the conditional racial differences also qualify as race/gender-specific differences.
27. The test of statistical significance is run with dichotomous versions of the racial difference
at issue and the criterion variable on which it is being compared. For the test of an overall racial
difference, male and female jurors of each race are grouped; the comparison is between all of the
white and all of the black jurors; the tested difference is identified as WJ/BJ in the tables. For
conditional racial differences, blacks and whites of the identified gender are compared and those
of the other gender are treated as missing; the tested difference is either WMJJBMJ or WFJ/BFJ.
For race/gender-specific differences, the jurors of a given race and gender are compared against
jurors in the other three such categories; the four alternatives are represented as WMJ/O, WFJ/
0, BMJ/0, or BFJ/0 (in which the "0" stands for all other jurors). The criterion (dependant)
variables are dichotomized at the point that maximizes the percentage difference between black
and white jurors in Tables 2 through 4. This standardizes the comparisons of variables and econ-
omizes the presentation of statistical data. The <.10, <.05, and <.01 levels of statistical signifi-
cance are indicated in Tables 2 through 5.
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1. The Crime: Characterizations
Near the beginning of the CJP interview, jurors were asked to de-
scribe the crime to the interviewer so that he or she could "understand
what happened and why." This open-ended query was then followed
by a question that asked jurors how well various words or phrases
described the killing. They were given four response options: "very
well," "fairly well," "not too well," and "not at all." Differences were
most pronounced in the percentage who said the words or phrases
described the defendant "very well." Black and white jurors from the
same cases differed according to the three-fold 20% rule on five of the
twelve characterizations presented to them. These five characteriza-
tions appear in Table 2.
TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF JURORS SAYING VARIOUS WORDS OR
PHRASES DESCRIBED THE CRIME "VERY WELL" BY JURORS' RACE
AND GENDER a IN BLACK-DEFENDANT/WHITE-VICTIM CASES WITH
INTERVIEWS FROM JURORS OF BOTH RACES
White White Black Black Tested
Males Females Males Females Differenceb
OVERALL RACIAL DIFFERENCES
Victim made to suffer 46.7 52.0 20.0 31.6 WJ/BJ **
RACE/GENDER SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES
Vicious 90.0 64.0 64.3 63.2 WMJ/O **
Repulsive 66.7 92.0 60.0 47.4 WFJ/O **
Cold-blooded 75.9 80.0 35.7 78.9 BMJ/O **
Depraved 53.3 58.3 42.9 21.1 BFJ/O **
* p <.10; ** p <.05; *** p <.01
Percentages are based on numbers of jurors within the following ranges: WM=29-30; WF=24-
25; BM=14-15; BF=19.
Abbreviations: W white, B black, M male, F female, J jurors, 0 all other jurors / compared to.
One of these crime characterizations-"the victim was made to suf-
fer"-distinguished between black and white jurors of both genders in
these B/W cases by at least twenty percentage points, and tested sig-
nificant at the p < .05 level. Specifically, white males and females
were more likely than their black counterparts to say that "the victim
was made to suffer" described the crime "very well." Note that the
Given that the sampling of jurors was clustered by trial, a traditional test of statistical indepen-
dence such as Chi Square would not be appropriate. However, the STATA 8.0 software package
allows the user to calculate an F statistic adjusted for multilievel and stratified data. The p-value
associated with this F statistic can be interpreted in the same way as the p-value for the Chi
Square statistic (See StataCorp. 2003. Stata Statistical Software: Release 8.0. College Station,
TX: Stata Corporation, Stata Survey Data: Reference Manual Release 8.0, pg. 73) The
probability levels reported in Tables 2-4 have been computed with an adjustment for the cluster-
ing of jurors by trial.
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use of the construction "was made to" rather than the simple past
tense of the verb "suffer" implies that the suffering was more than
incidental to the crime, that the defendant willfully or intentionally
inflicted or imposed the suffering. The greater recourse of white than
of black jurors to this description of the same black on white crimes
implies that white jurors of both genders see these crimes as more
grievous or agonizing for the white victim owing to the deliberate ac-
tions of the black defendant than do black jurors who served on the
same juries.
The other four instances in which we find sizable and statistically
significant race-linked differences were each distinctive to a different
race/gender category. More often than others, white males saw the
crime as "vicious," and white females felt it was "repulsive" (by
twenty-six and twenty-five points, respectively). The belief that the
crime was vicious implies a malicious or malevolent motivation or a
cruel or brutal method of killing (or both); they are both obviously
severe indictments of the offender. The repulsive appellation distinc-
tive to white females describes a visceral response to the crime. This
is more the emotional impact of the crime on the observer, or in this
case the juror, than a characterization of the crime per se. It seems
likely that seeing the crime as vicious disposes the juror to think death
is the appropriate punishment and that feeling it was repulsive pro-
vides emotional support for such a conclusion.
By contrast, compared to the other groups, black males resist the
notion that the killing was cold-blooded and black females the infer-
ence that the crime was depraved (by forty and twenty-two points,
respectively). That is to say, the characterizations that distinguish
black males and black females, respectively, from the other categories
of jurors are both respects in which the black jurors in question fall
below the other three groups in assigning this attribution. Cold-
blooded conveys a harsh, calculating motivation and a depraved, de-
generate, perverted character of the perpetrator. Black jurors are less
likely to use these pejorative attributions.
These four race/gender-specific black/white differences reflect com-
plementary disparities in the perceived heinousness of these interra-
cial crimes. The crimes are more vicious for white men and less cold-
blooded for black men; this compounds the difference in perceived
aggravation between the men of the two races. They are more repul-
sive to the white women and less depraved to the black women; again
the difference in aggravation is cumulative. These complementary dif-
ferences, together with the differences in "victim made to suffer" for
whites and blacks of both genders, leave little doubt that white jurors
2004] 1507
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see these black defendant/white victim killings as more heinous or ag-
gravated than do their black counterparts in the very same cases.
Needless to say, these characterizations of the crime harbor infer-
ences about the defendant. That is, whether the crime was vicious or
cold-blooded, depraved or repulsive, and whether the victim was
made to suffer, convey impressions of the defendant, his character,
and motives. We should not be surprised, therefore, to see differences
by race in characterizations of the defendant as well.
2. The Defendant: Characterizations
After asking about the crime, the interview turned to questions
about the defendant. The first of these listed twenty-one words or
phrases and asked jurors how well each describe the defendant. Race-
linked differences in terms of the three-fold 20% rule appeared for
eight of these twenty-one words or phrases; seven were differences in
the percentage saying "very well"; and one (at the bottom of the ta-
ble) in the percentage saying "not at all." There are no overall racial
differences that hold for both male and female jurors by as much as
twenty points. There are three conditional differences that exceed
twenty percentage points for one but not the other gender. In five
instances, a single specific race/gender category (most often black
males) differs from the other three by at least twenty points. The
seven characterizations that describe the defendant "very well" and
the one that describes him "not at all" appear in Table 3.
All three of the conditional racial differences show a sizable, thirty
to forty percentage point, difference between blacks and whites of one
gender but only a difference of twelve or fewer points for the other in
these B/W cases. Two of these conditional differences that hold for
males have been reported earlier.28 Thus, in predicted dangerous-
ness, white men most often and black men least often, said the defen-
dant was "dangerous to other people," and in perceived remorse,
black men most often and white men least often said the defendant
was "sorry for what he did." The third conditional racial difference
not previously observed holds for women but not men. When the is-
sue is mental well-being; black women were most and white women
least likely to say the defendant was "emotionally unstable or dis-
turbed." Hence, this further exploration of the data adds the charac-
terization "emotionally unstable or disturbed" to perceived remorse
28. See Bowers et al., supra note 16, at 233 tbl. 7. These two characterizations are "dangerous
to other people" and "sorry for what he did."
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TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE OF JURORS SAYING VARIOUS WORDS OR
PHRASES DESCRIBED THE DEFENDANT "VERY WELL" OR "NOT AT
ALL" BY JURORS' RACE AND GENDERa FOR BLACK-DEFENDANT/
WHITE-VICTIM CASES WITH INTERVIEWS FROM JURORS OF
BOTH RACES
White White Black Black Tested
Males Females Males Females Difference b
CONDITIONAL DIFFERENCES
Dangerous to other 63.3 52.0 26.7 42.1 WMJ/BMJ **
people
Sorry for what he did 7.4 20.0 46.7 31.6 WMJ/BMJ **
Emotionally unstable 23.3 12.0 20.0 42.1 WFJ/BFJ *
or disturbed
RACE/GENDER SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES
A good person who 10.7 8.0 53.3 10.5 BMJ/O *
got off on the
wrong foot
Someone who loved 0.0 10.0 50.0 12.5 BMJ/O ***
his own family
An occasional drug 11.5 18.2 38.5 16.7 BMJ/O *
abuser
Doesn't know his 35.7 29.2 40.0 5.9 BFJ/O **
place in society
Doesn't know right 40.0 68.0 35.7 44.4 WFJ/O **
from wrong (%
"not at all")
60 66.7 32.0 57.9
• p <.10; ** p <.05; *** p <.01
a Percentages are based on numbers of jurors within the following ranges: WM=26-30; WF=20-
25; BM=12-15; BF=16.
Abbreviations: W white, B black, M male, F female, J jurors, 0 all other jurors / compared to.
and predicted dangerousness, as a sizable race-linked difference in
these cases, though one confined to females.
Why do these strong aggravating and mitigating factors divide or
polarize black and white jurors of one gender but not the other in B/
W cases? Perhaps these are domains in which men or women are gen-
erally granted primacy. And it may be that the racial polarization of
males or females is partly owing to their tendency to assert that pri-
macy in jury deliberations to the point of becoming adversaries on
these gender primacy issues. In other words, these may be factors that
tend to pit blacks and whites of one gender against each other-that
make them take sides or feel they are at odds in these cases. And
there may be a parallel among the crime characterizations shown in
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Table 2. Thus, an instrumental continuum that encompasses both vi-
cious and cold-blooded would place white and black males at opposite
ends and leave the females of both races in between. Likewise, an
expressive continuum including both depraved and repulsive would
separate white and black women and leave the men of both races in
between.
Of the five defendant characterizations distinctive to jurors in one
of the race/gender categories, three are specific to black males and
one each to black and to white females. Black males were especially
apt to see redeeming qualities in the defendant. They were substan-
tially and significantly more likely than others to say that he was "a
good person who got off on the wrong foot" and "someone who loved
his own family" (above any other race/gender category by forty-three
and thirty-nine points, respectively). That is, black males see basic
virtues or redemptive values, such as "good person" and "loved fam-
ily," when others do not. They were also more willing than others by
a smaller margin (of twenty points) to concede the defendant's ad-
verse lifestyle of being "an occasional drug abuser," consistent with
having "got off on the wrong foot."
Women jurors were distinctive in their reactions to two phrases that
might be regarded as clichds. Black females were less likely than
other jurors to see the defendant as "not knowing his place in soci-
ety." This language is toxic in that it was used as opprobrium for
blacks under Jim Crow. The virtually blanket rejection of this charac-
terization of the defendant among black females suggests that they are
especially sensitive and resistant to such race-linked labeling or stere-
otyping and the punitiveness it implies. White females were more
likely than others to deny that the defendant does not "know right
from wrong" (the percentages pertain to the "not at all" response).
Not knowing right from wrong may be seen by them as an "excuse"
that could exempt the defendant from death as punishment, an excuse
they are especially unwilling to grant the black defendant whose vic-
tim is white.
The absence of crime or defendant characterizations that signifi-
cantly distinguish between blacks and whites of both genders is con-
spicuous. In fact, there is only one such factor among the five in Table
2 and none among the eight in Table 3. By contrast, crime and defen-
dant characterizations that distinguish black male jurors from others
are most common. In particular, the fundamentally redemptive quali-
ties of being a good person who got off on the wrong foot and being
someone who loved his family (in Table 3) are characterizations that
distinguish black males by roughly forty percentage points from the
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nearest other race/gender categories. Are these very sizable differ-
ences in defendant characterizations between black male and other
jurors reflected in other things jurors thought, felt, and observed dur-
ing the trial?
3. The Defendant and His Family: Observations, Thoughts,
Feelings
The questioning in the CJP interview moved from jurors' character-
izations of the defendant to their observations of the defendant during
the trial and the thoughts and feelings they had about the defendant
and about his family. Jurors' responses to this series of questions tend
to provide a personalized view of the defendant in the trial context.
In all, these questions included some twenty-five statements to which
jurors could give a "yes" or "no" response. Black male jurors figure
prominently in all ten of the factors that show racial differences. Two
of the ten factors display racial differences that hold for both male and
female jurors; the other eight differences are all distinctive to black
males. The ten statements to which jurors' responses differed by race
of juror appear in Table 4.
The largest overall difference we have seen so far between black
and white jurors in these B/W cases appears in Table 4. It is the much
greater tendency of blacks than whites of both genders to say they
"found the defendant likable as a person." The differences are forty-
two points between black and white males and thirty-three points be-
tween black and white females. This much greater tendency of blacks
of both genders to see the defendant as a likable person surely dis-
courages the dehumanization of the defendant thought to be crucial
for a death verdict.29 This marked tendency to see the defendant as a
likable person among black male and female jurors, together with the
lesser but consistent tendency of white male and female jurors to be-
lieve that the defendant made the victim suffer (shown in Table 2),
present a fundamentally contrasting picture of the crime and the de-
fendant between black and white jurors irrespective of gender. The
other factor in Table 4 that divides black and white jurors of both
genders is the more common impression among whites that the defen-
dant "appeared bored" during the trial. Evidently, the white jurors
were more apt to find the black defendant's courtroom demeanor or
behavior inappropriate for someone whose life was at stake.
29. See Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and
the Impulse To Condemn To Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1451 (1997).
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TABLE 4. PERCENTAGE OF JURORS AFFIRMING STATEMENTS
ABOUT THE DEFENDANT AND HIS FAMILY BY JURORS' RACE AND
GENDERa FOR BLACK-DEFENDANT/WHITE-VICTIM CASES IN WHICH
BOTH BLACK AND WHITE JURORS WERE INTERVIEWED
White White Black Black Tested
Males Females Males Females Difference b
OVERALL RACIAL DIFFERENCES
Found the defendant likable as a person
22.2 9.5 64.3 42.1 WJ/BJ **
At trial the defendant appeared bored
66.7 62.5 33.3 42.1 WJ/BJ **
RACE/GENDER SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES
At trial defendant appeared sorry
10.0 20.8 73.3 36.8 BMJ/O **
Imagined yourself in defendant's family's situation
30.0 48.0 80.0 47.4 BMJ/O **
Imagined yourself as a member of defendant's family
24.1 4.0 46.7 21.1 BMJ/O **
Imagined yourself in defendant's situation
26.7 28.0 53.3 31.6 BMJ/O **
Defendant reminded you of someone
13.3 0.0 46.7 15.8 BMJ/O ***
Defendant's family seemed very different from yours
69.0 64.0 26.7 47.4 BMJ/O **
At trial defendant appeared uncomfortable
17.2 16.0 46.7 26.3 BMJ/O **
Defendant's mood change after the guilty verdict
17.2 20.8 60.0 36.8 BMJ/O **
* p <.10; ** p <.05; *** p <.01
Percentages are based on numbers of jurors within the following ranges: WM=29-30; WF=21-
25; BM=14-15; BF=19.
" Abbreviations: W white, B black, M male, F female, J jurors, 0 all other jurors, / compared to.
Most distinctive about the pattern of findings in Table 4 is the fact
that black men alone were decidedly different from the other jurors
on the remaining eight of these ten factors. Not surprising, in view of
the conditional difference in characterizations of the defendant as re-
morseful in Table 3, is the greater tendency of black male jurors than
others to say "at trial the defendant appeared sorry" (thirty-six points
above any other race/gender category and sixty-three points above
white males). In fact, the corresponding percentages for these two
statements about remorse in Tables 3 and 4 are quite similar, except
that black males more often said that the defendant appeared sorry
than that he was sorry (73.3% versus 46.7%). Although some black
male jurors evidently discounted appearances of remorse, it seems
clear that they were more likely than others to perceive them.
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Conspicuous is the tendency of black male jurors to identify or em-
pathize with the defendant and his family. Three of these statements
explicitly involved the juror imagining him or herself in the shoes of
the defendant or his family: "Imagined yourself in the defendant's
family's situation," "imagined yourself as a member of the defen-
dant's family," and "imagined yourself in the defendant's situation."
Notably, it is the defendant's family's situation with which black male
jurors most distinctively identify (exceeding others by more than
thirty points).
The defendant and his family were also more likely to provoke
recollections and comparisons in the minds of black male jurors.
These jurors were more likely than others to affirm that "the defen-
dant reminded you of someone," (by thirty-one points) and to deny
that "the defendant's family seemed very different from yours" (by
twenty-one points). Here again, the responses of black male jurors
suggest that they more often saw themselves as a person like the de-
fendant and like the members of his family. The consequences of
greater identification and empathy with the defendant and his family
may account for the heightened sensibility of such jurors in response
to the final two statements in Table 4, the observations, "at trial the
defendant appeared uncomfortable" and "the defendant's mood
change after the guilty verdict was handed down."
Thus, black and white males differ substantially, not only in respect
to strong aggravating and mitigating considerations, such as danger-
ousness, remorse, and lingering doubt, but also in the ways they see
the crime (i.e., vicious versus not cold-blooded) and in the degree to
which they personalize the defendant and identify with him and his
family. The differences are most distinctive for black males; their
stands and responses depart from others' more often and more sub-
stantially. The distinctiveness of their responses suggests why the
presence of a single black male on the jury can have the very sizable
effect on sentencing outcomes we have seen in Table 1.
Although white males are not as different from others in most of
these respects, their perceptions and perspectives are nevertheless
consistent and largely at odds with those of black males. In fact, on
five of the eight factors that show black male specific effects (in Table
4), white males were at the opposite extreme, as they were in charac-
terizations of dangerousness and remorse (in Table 3).30 To the ex-
tent that white male jurors dominate the jury in numbers or




assertiveness, they may reinforce each others' perspectives and thus
generate a climate of punitiveness that leads other jurors to disregard
evidence of mitigation or to give it short shrift in considering
punishment.
Above all, these data make it clear that identification or empathy
with the defendant, and even more so with the defendant's family, is
distinctive to black male jurors in these B/W cases. More than others,
they appear to place themselves in the role of the defendant's parents.
They identify with this situation, even to the point of imagining them-
selves as a member of the defendant's family. They are more likely
than others to see similarities between the defendant's family and
their own. They are also more likely than the other jurors to say they
imagined themselves in the situation of the defendant. The identifica-
tion black male jurors make with the defendant and his family must
make them especially sensitive to the human dimensions of the capital
sentencing decision, and it must surely enhance their receptivity to
mitigation. Is it surprising that black male jurors in these black-defen-
dant/white-victim cases are much more likely than others to identify
with the defendant who himself is a black male?
4. Receptivity to Aggravation and Mitigation
In addition to jurors' perspectives on the crime, the defendant, and
the defendant's family, we have also sought to determine whether ju-
rors' race and gender are related to their receptivity to the prosecu-
tion's evidence and arguments of aggravation and the defense's
evidence and arguments of mitigation at the punishment stage of the
trial. For this purpose, we have adopted a scaling procedure devel-
oped by Thomas W. Brewer that matches the arguments advanced by
prosecution and defense with the considerations jurors reported as
more or less important in their punishment decision.31
The measure of receptivity to aggravation draws upon seven
matched pairs of prosecution arguments and juror punishment consid-
31. See Thomas William Brewer, Don't Kill My Friend: The Attorney-Client Relationship in
Capital Cases and Its Effect on Jury Receptivity to Mitigation Evidence (2003) (unpublished
dissertation, University at Albany, State University of New York) (on file with author) (ab-
stracted in 64 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT. 631 (2003)). Brewer developed a Mitigation Scale
based on twelve statements describing evidence and arguments advanced by the prosecutor at
the punishment stage of the trial and corresponding considerations that the juror reported as
being "very," "fairly," "not very," or "not at all" important in their punishment decision. He
found that receptivity to mitigation was significantly greater for black jurors in black-defendant/
white-victim cases than for other juror, defendant, and victim racial combinations. Here, we
extend and refine that finding by examining receptivity to aggravation as well as mitigation, by
narrowing the sample to black and white jurors who were interviewed from the same cases, and
by examining gender as well as race of juror.
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erations, and the receptivity to mitigation scale uses ten such matched
mitigation arguments and punishment considerations. 32 The individ-
ual juror's receptivity to aggravation is the average of the importance
he or she attributes to the aggravation arguments that he or she re-
ports the prosecutor advanced; receptivity to mitigation is likewise the
average importance in a juror's sentencing decisions of the arguments
he or she said the defense advanced in the case. 33 Of course, these
measures of receptivity are limited by the particular questions asked
about arguments and considerations of aggravation and mitigation, re-
produced in the Appendix.
For the four race/gender categories of jurors, Table 5 presents the
mean receptivity score and the percentage of jurors with low (.00-.99),
medium (1.00-1.99), and high (2.00+) receptivity scores, first on the
mitigation scale and then on the aggravation scale.34
White jurors are much less receptive to mitigation than their black
counterparts in these B/W cases. This is evident in both the mean
mitigation scale scores and in the percentage of jurors scoring less
than 1.00 on the mitigation scale. The fact that white jurors' mean
scale scores are slightly less than 1.00 indicates that they typically
found mitigation arguments "not very important" in deciding on pun-
ishment. A score of 1.00 also implies that for every mitigation argu-
32. In a section of the interview that asked about the penalty, trial jurors were presented with
sixteen aggravation arguments the prosecutor might have advanced and fourteen mitigation ar-
guments the defense might have made. In a later section of questions that asked jurors about
how they reached their punishment decision, there were separate batteries of twenty-three and
thirty-nine considerations or factors that might have been important in jurors' decision making.
Of the sixteen aggravation arguments, seven could be matched with punishment considerations,
and of the fourteen mitigation arguments, ten could be matched with such considerations. The
exact wording of the arguments and considerations used in the construction of these two scales
appears in the Appendix.
33. For each aggravating or mitigating argument reported by a juror, he or she could indicate
that the corresponding consideration was "very important" (scored 3), "fairly important"
(scored 2), "not very" important (scored 1), or "not at all" important (scored 0), in his or her
decision about punishment. A juror's aggravation or mitigation receptivity score is the average
of the importance responses (scored 0 through 3) for those arguments that he or she said the
prosecutor made with respect to aggravation or the defense attorney made with respect to miti-
gation. For example, if a juror reported that the prosecutor advanced three of the seven aggra-
vation arguments and indicated that one was "very important" (score 3), one was "fairly
important" (score 2), and one was "not at all" important (score 0), as a punishment considera-
tion, he or she would receive a score of 1.67 on the receptivity to aggravation index. Jurors who
reported that none of the seven aggravation arguments or none of the ten mitigation arguments
were made have missing values on the respective scales and are therefore excluded from the
analysis. The scale values are strictly averages; there is no adjustment or weighting for the num-
ber of aggravating or mitigating factors on which the scale score is based.
34. We depart here from our earlier practice of presenting the criterion variables in dichoto-
mous form at the point of greatest difference by race in order to show more of the distribution
and divergence of scores on the two receptivity scales.
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TABLE 5. RECEPTIVITY TO AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING
ARGUMENTS BY JURORS' RACE/GENDER COMBINATIONS FOR
BLACK-DEFENDANT/WHITE-VICTIM CASES IN WHICH BOTH BLACK
AND WHITE JURORS WERE INTERVIEWED
White White Black Black
Males Females Males Females
RECEPTIVITY TO MITIGATION SCALE
Mean receptivity to mitigation
.96 .99 1.30 1.61
Percent scoring:
0.00 to .9 48.0 57.1 10.0 14.3 *
1.00 to 1.99 44.0 33.3 80.0 64.3
2.00 or more+ 8.0 9.6 10.0 21.4
Number of jurors (25) (21) (10) (14)
RECEPTIVITY TO AGGRAVATION SCALE
Mean receptivity to aggravation
2.22 2.24 2.42 2.25
Percent scoring:
0.00 to .99 11.1 8.7 0.0 6.7
1.00 to 1.99 14.8 13.0 14.3 26.7
2.00 or more 74.1 78.3 85.7 66.7
Number of jurors (27) (23) (14) (15)
* The overall racial difference (WJ/BJ) in the low (vs. medium and high)
receptivity to mitigation category yields a Chi Square significance of p = .054.
ment found "fairly important," another was "not at all important"; for
every one found "very important," two others were "not at all
important." 35
The percentage scoring less than 1.00 on the mitigation scale under-
scores the difference by race of juror. It shows that roughly half of the
white jurors, but only 10% of black males and 14% of black females
fell below the "not very important" threshold for mitigation, where
"not at all" responses outnumber or outweigh any "fairly" or "very"
important responses. The roughly forty-point overall black/white dif-
ference in percentage scoring low on the mitigation scale (38.0 points
for males and 42.8 points for females) reaches statistical significance at
the .10 level (p = .054).36 Evidently, many more white than black
35. Note that the base numbers of jurors are relatively low for the mitigation means and
percentages owing to the exclusion of jurors who reported that the defense made none of the ten
mitigation arguments on which the scale is based. The failure of jurors to report mitigation
arguments could itself reflect a lack of receptivity to mitigation. That is, some mitigation argu-
ments that were actually made may not have registered with these jurors. Hence, there could be
an upward bias in the mitigation scale scores.
36. Chi Square tests were conducted with the scale scores dichotomized between .99 and 1.00
and between 1.99 and 2.0. The only difference that tested significant was between black and
white jurors (WJ/BJ) in the percent low receptivity to mitigation p = .054.
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jurors were unwilling to give effect to considerations of mitigation in
their punishment decisions.
Jurors are much more receptive to aggravation than to mitigation.
The mean aggravation scores far exceed the mean mitigation scores;
they are above 2.00 for jurors in each race and gender category. In
effect, jurors in all race and gender categories found the arguments
they said the prosecution advanced were, on average, between "fairly"
and "very" important in their decision making on punishment. More-
over, racial differences are slight and inconsistent. The mean for
black males at 2.4 is slightly above those for the other three catego-
ries, which are all on a par very slightly above 2.2. In percentage scor-
ing high on receptivity to aggravation, black males are a few points
above, but black females a few points below, the percentages for
whites of both genders. These differences in receptivity to aggrava-
tion are not substantial or consistent enough to qualify as anything
more than random fluctuations.
It is clear from these data that African Americans of both genders
are more likely than their white counterparts in these black-defen-
dant/white-victim cases to consider, and to give effect in their sentenc-
ing decisions to, arguments of mitigation that articulate why the
defendant's life should be spared. 37 Perhaps this is not surprising be-
cause, as we have seen above, they are more likely in these cases to
find the defendant likable as a person, more likely in the case of black
females to see him as emotionally unstable or disturbed, and more
likely in the case of black males to see him as remorseful and to iden-
tify with him and his family.
More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that blacks are roughly on a par
with whites in receptivity to aggravation. Evidently, their greater con-
cern with mitigation has not blunted their sensibility to the heinous
character of the crime and the defendant's role in it. In fact, an exam-
ination of the components of the aggravation index indicates that
black jurors of both genders attributed more importance than whites
to "the loss and grief of the victim's family" and "the punishment
wanted by the victim's family" as arguments for the death penalty.
This greater sensitivity to the loss, grief, and desire for punishment on
the part of the victim's family may reflect the fact that black jurors are
more familiar than whites with the realities of loosing a family mem-
ber to murder in their own communities, if not in their own lives.
37. Brewer has also found that black jurors in black-defendant/white-victim cases are distinc-
tively more receptive to mitigation than other defendant/victim/juror combinations. See Thomas
W. Brewer, Race and Jurors? Receptivity to Mitigation in Capital Cases: The Effect of Jurors,
Defendants', and Victim's Race in Combination, (under review) (on file with author).
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A critical question is: Do the much lower receptivity to mitigation
scores of white jurors mean that many of them fail to "give effect" to
mitigation in their punishment decisions, contrary to the requirement
of Morgan v. Illinois?38 We saw in Table 2 that white jurors see these
crimes as more heinous than do black jurors. In various combinations,
white males and females were significantly more apt to say that the
victim was made to suffer, the crime was vicious, and it made them
sick to think about it. There is evidence that becoming obsessed with
the grotesque character of the killing may have the effect of blunting
or blocking jurors' willingness to consider mitigation.39 Certainly, to
the extent that the character of the killing convinced jurors that the
punishment should be death even before the penalty stage of the trial,
they could be expected to attribute little or no importance to mitiga-
tion arguments.40 A closer look at the accounts jurors gave of their
decision making in selected cases will provide additional perspective
on these matters.
B. Race-Linked Jury Dynamics: Narrative Accounts
We turn now to jurors' accounts of their deliberations on punish-
ment to learn how race plays out in their decision making. We are
interested both in the ways in which the racial differences observed in
the foregoing statistical analysis surface in the thinking of jurors as
they respond to one another's arguments and in what we might call
the jury dynamics of decision making that include the steps jurors
take, the arguments or tactics they use, and with what success they are
able to bring their perspectives to bare in the jury's decision making.
For this purpose we examine the decision making of four juries-
two all-white juries dominated by males and two mixed-race juries
38. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
39. See Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is Over-
whelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 1011
(2001) for evidence from jurors' accounts of a tendency of jurors to discount or ignore evidence
of mitigation in the face of an aggravated killing. See also William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed
Impartiality In Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt- Trial Experience, and Premature
Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1476 (1998), for evidence from jurors' accounts that
grotesque details of the crime, especially as conveyed by photographs of the victim's body, tend
to prompt a decision that the punishment should be death at the guilt stage of the trial.
40. The greater tendency for white jurors to see the B/W killing as heinous, as shown in Table
2, appears not to be reflected in greater receptivity to aggravation scores in Table 5. Perhaps this
is because the heinousness of the crime as perceived by white jurors when the defendant is black
and the victim is white constitutes a single compelling dimension of aggravation that they be-
come obsessively concerned about to the exclusion of other aspects of aggravation. Such a sin-
gle-minded concentration on one as opposed to several aspects of aggravation would have the
effect of reducing the receptivity to aggravation score because it is the average of the importance
attributed to the full complement of aggravation arguments.
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with at least one black male juror. These four cases have been se-
lected because they illustrate themes in the dynamics of decision mak-
ing characteristic of white male dominated juries and of juries with a
black male present. All four are black defendant/white victim cases;
two were drawn from the eleven B/W cases with all white juries and
five or more white male jurors;41 the other two come from the four-
teen mixed race B/W cases in which we interviewed at least one black
male juror.
These accounts will illustrate some of the ways in which jurors'
races come to play in the joint or group decision making of capital
juries. What we see here, together with what the statistical analyses
show, will provide some tentative answers to the question of what is
the role of jurors' race in capital sentencing, especially in racially sen-
sitive cases in which the killing crosses racial boundaries.
1. First White Male-Dominated Jury
The deliberations on cases in which all of the jurors are white are
remarkable precisely because they come across so lacking in contro-
versy or dispute; the tension that characterizes mixed race juries is
largely absent. Indeed, there appears to be relatively little disagree-
ment among the jurors, in either the guilt or punishment decisions.
While some jurors find these decisions emotionally difficult to reach,
they are not ordinarily marred by dissention. In fact, it is not uncom-
mon for jurors to make the two decisions at the same time, that is, to
reach their stand on punishment during guilt deliberations. Both of
the following white male dominated juries illustrate this pattern.
In this first Missouri case, there were ten white men and two white
women on the jury. The jury voted for death for an African-Ameri-
can man who killed his white wife whom he believed was having an
affair. When asked "what were the main areas or points on which
jurors disagreed [during guilt deliberations]," one of the female jurors
responded:
J: I'd say there was a few jurors that were willing to come up with a
guilty verdict if it automatically meant the death penalty. So we
argued that out a little bit cuz we tried to explain how it doesn't
automatically mean that. We still have the penalty phase. And they
were like, no, no, no, that's not right. We did disagree about that. It
was just that they were dealing with their own issues on how they
41. There were fifteen cases with mixed-race juries and five or more white male jurors, but the
all white juries were selected for examination on the premise that they offer the clearest exam-
ples of the dynamics of white male-dominance in sentencing African American defendants
whose victims were white.
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felt about the death penalty and not really focusing on this phase,
they just couldn't get beyond that.
Another juror from this case also acknowledged that the jury dis-
cussed the punishment during the guilt deliberations. When this
(male) juror was asked if the jurors talked about whether the defen-
dant would or should get the death penalty, he said: "I think some of
the jurors may have talked about that." And when he was asked what
the jurors said, he responded: "[P]retty much that he was guilty and
that he should get the death penalty."
The implication here is that these jurors are not waiting to hear mit-
igating circumstances-that once they pass the threshold of guilt,
death is the presumptive sentence. Could it be, however, that they
would change their minds once they were exposed to mitigating cir-
cumstances at the penalty phase of the trial? Not so for these ten
white male and two white female jurors deciding the fate of this Afri-
can-American man. Rather, the jurors seem to have virtually ignored
evidence or arguments of mitigation. Another male juror expressed
difficulty in recalling how they arrived at their punishment decision:
I: In your own words, can you tell me what the jury did to reach its
decision about the defendant's punishment? How did the jury get
started; what topics did it discuss, in what order; what were the ma-
jor disagreements and how were they resolved?
J: You know through our whole discussion here the guilt or inno-
cent portion of it, I can recall dates, names, years, and then we get
into the [punishment] portion of it. I'm not having the same re-
sponses. I'm not remembering as clearly, I don't know if that's a
self defense thing.
This same male juror acknowledged that one of the female jurors ap-
peared to be having a difficult time:
J: I think it probably affected [juror's name] more than anybody in
the whole group. She didn't cry though. At times there were hugs
that were given cuz she was, we could kinda tell she, uh, she didn't
cry but she was close. Some of the guys just gave her a "pep hug" or
whatever and uh, there was real bonding with that group.
A female juror who was reluctant to go along with the majority cor-
roborated the difficulty that some of the jurors experienced in arriving
at the punishment decision, but she too does not point to mitigation as
the reason:
J: It was, uh, I don't know. There were several of us who weren't in
agreement for awhile, right away, just not sure really, I think we just
weren't ready to make that decision. There really wasn't any rea-
son, it was just like, this is, we need to think this over more. Diffi-
cult decision to make. It's probably the most difficult decision ever.
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I: So, when you did go along with the majority, you just came to
that point?
J: It just happened, it was weird how it happened, it was like a fog
that just happened.
It seems clear that a reasoned evaluation of mitigating circum-
stances was not the focus of this jury's penalty deliberation. One of
the jurors mentioned that the defendant's mother and brother testi-
fied, yet no one referred to what they said or reported taking their
testimony into account. While one or two of the jurors were hesitant
to vote for death, there was no explanation in terms of mitigation.
Moreover, while some of the jurors found the experience emotionally
difficult, there was no mention of pressure or antagonism in the jury
room. In fact, one of the jurors described the final decision as occur-
ring in "a fog." And another juror talked about consoling and "pep
hugging" a juror who was troubled by the experience.
Husbands who kill wives suspected of infidelity are uncommon on
death rows. What trumped or disabled mitigation in this case? One
possibility is the defendant's perceived future dangerousness. The fe-
male juror was asked:
I: How did [defendant] appear to you during the trial?
J: On the stand, he was sweating and he showed a lot of anger. He
leaned forward. My little spot was right next to his. I was a lil' bit
nervous cuz you, you could just tell it was building up inside of him.
He just got a lot of anger and um, um, and so he almost, I was
aim... I guess I felt intimidated because he would lean forward and
just, you guys have to believe me, this is[n't a] bullshit kind'a thing.
Looking at him sitting there from when he started talking and I, I
would say he's a little bit frightening.
This same female juror went on to describe her thoughts or feelings
about the defendant's family as follows:
J: After the trial was over, there was a lot of fear in the jury about
the family, like they would be out there waiting when we got out if
we sentenced him to death. So we asked the sheriff's department to
bring the security people in when we gave down the sentence and
kept the people in the courtroom till we were all out of the building
and on our way out so, there was some fear there but, projected
fear. You never know. You don't know the family.
One of the male jurors, while stating that he was not concerned with
the defendant returning to society if not given the death penalty, went
on to say that he "pack[ed]" a gun for a week afterwards:
J: No, I did carry it. Course, I do go anyway, anytime I travel.




Yet this is not so much the defendant's future dangerousness as a vis-
ceral fear of him personally and of his family's retaliation for the im-
position of the death penalty. These primal responses to the
defendant and his family seem out of line with his status as an inde-
pendent businessman in the community with no criminal record but in
line, perhaps, with conscious and unconscious racial attitudes that the
Court in Turner42 anticipated in murder cases that cross racial
boundaries.
There is another indication that unconscious racial attitudes may
have been at work-that a black man who marries a white woman and
also kills her made the crime especially offensive. When asked "what
was the best thing about the give and take of jury deliberations," one
juror explained:
J: The best thing I think we all had a good sense that we were rep-
resentatives of other citizens in the state and we were making a de-
cision as representatives, that it wasn't just our opinion that this that
we were speaking for other Missourians.
Do other jurors who serve on mixed-race juries in black-defendant/
white-victim cases express the same fear of the defendant or his fam-
ily? Do jurors experience the same fear when they are the same race
as the defendant? The following cases provide some answers.
2. Second White Male-Dominated Jury
In this second example of an all white jury deciding the fate of a
black man (in this case accused of killing a white child), there are
equal numbers of men and women. With five or more white males,
the jury still qualifies as "white male-dominated. '43 As such, it is not
surprising that the jurors in this case, just as in the first example, ex-
press little disagreement concerning the evidence, the interpretation
thereof, or the appropriate verdicts.
All four jurors who were interviewed, two men and two women, not
surprisingly pointed to the defendant's confession as a critical reason
for finding the defendant guilty of the capital offense. As one of the
female jurors said when asked when she first thought that the defen-
dant was guilty of capital murder:
J: Opening arguments. I was willing to be convinced otherwise, if
the evidence showed it, but from the opening arguments the defense
came in saying that yes, he did it. And from everything that was
said by both attorneys in their opening arguments, there wasn't any-
42. 476 U.S. 28.
43. This designation is based on the stark difference in the likelihood of a death sentence
between juries with four or fewer and five or more white male jurors (shown in Table 1).
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thing there to convince me that it should be anything other than
capital but as I said, I was willing to be convinced otherwise if there
was evidence that would show this.
One of the male jurors noted that the defendant's confession was
indicative of his honesty, but that fact was actually used against the
defendant. When this juror was asked whether the defendant ap-
peared sincere, he responded: "Well, he was honest in the fact that
he, you know, said he'd done it, told his lawyers that he did it.
Course, they were copping second degree." This juror went on to
explain that "we knew what the verdict was gonna be for [guilt]. We
coulda deliberated right there. The defense lawyer coulda been one
of the jurors. They already told us about the guilt. We didn't even
have to go into the jury room."
Jurors on this second case seemed less apt to discuss punishment
preferences during the guilt phase. These jurors were also more likely
to acknowledge, but no less likely to dismiss, mitigation. For instance,
the male juror said that "yea, something mental there but not to the
point that he didn't know what he was doing." This same juror noted
the defendant's complicated family history. He agreed that the defen-
dant was likely abused as a child and that he was "not [brought up]
the way you and I were brought up." This juror also noted that the
defendant's family "definitely didn't love him. They came into the
courtroom and they didn't even look at him." He then went on to say
that he "maybe [felt] pity a little bit the way they lived, you know"
and that he
would've like to talk to them about bringing them to the Lord,
that's for sure, I would've liked to help them just to be people, the
whole bunch of 'em starting with his dad. You know, it's depravity
all the way through. All the way down the family. You know, the
sins of the father were passed on through the third and fourth gen-
eration, bringing them into society and into the real life.
Hence, clearly, this juror sees what is thought to be mitigation, and
yet, when he was asked to describe the jury's deliberation on punish-
ment, he said: "[W]e went to [the room]. We went over judge's in-
structions. Took first vote. 11 yes, death, 1 no." The juror then talked
about the one hold out wanting to review some evidence after which
"we voted again and uh, 12 [for death] but there was three hours ho
there was some back and forth." There was no mention of any argu-
ments or persuasion or problems in reaching consensus on the
penalty.
The female juror's description of the sentencing stage, of the mitiga-
tion and the deliberation on sentencing, was quite similar. She noted
that the defendant "was described as mildly retarded but from my ob-
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servations he seemed to be very intelligent and manipulative," even
though this juror acknowledged that the defendant may have "com-
pleted the 12th grade" and that his his IQ was at a fifth-grade level.
She also recalled that the defense stressed the defendant's "deprived
background" as the primary reason why he should not receive a sen-
tence of death. And when asked about the points on which jurors
disagreed, this juror said "mitigation, was his background a mitigating
circumstance? Really a small issue." Her description of the sentenc-
ing deliberation is illustrative of just how easy it is for white jurors to
dismiss mitigation in the absence of blacks on the jury:
J: Well, we got started by reading the judge's instructions and then
by discussing what the defense claimed was mitigating. Basically
[the defendant's] background and whether that could be considered
to be a mitigating circumstance or deserved the death penalty. We
took one vote and one person voted against the death penalty and
without identifying that person, we tried, we kind of guessed that
that person thought possibly that there were mitigating circum-
stances. So, we discussed again what the instructions said, which
was not, when you say that he had a deprived background, but
would you say that this deprived background was a circumstance
that should excuse him from the death penalty, then we took an-
other vote and it was unanimous that he get the death penalty. So,
apparently the person was then decided as to whether he had a de-
prived background. We all agreed that he did but that didn't excuse
him from the punishment for what he did.
The other male juror who was interviewed on this case also noted
the existence of mitigation:
J: [The jury] talked a lot about [the defendant's] past, [how he was]
raised in a poor family. [At] age 10, [he was] living in an abandoned
car but at another girl's age of 10 [the victim in this case], he took
her life. He had no structure in his life; 24 brothers and sisters; his
father was a busy man. He had it rough.
This juror also noted that there was one juror who was initially reluc-
tant to vote for death:
J: We had one person on the jury that was a little slower than most
people and did not vote for the death penalty. We didn't single that
person [out] or anything. What we did from that point was we
opened it up for a discussion and if he wanted to discuss why or why
not. After we got to talk, we revoted and it was unanimous.
The jurors on this case thus acknowledged the existence of mitigat-
ing circumstances but readily dismissed them as unimportant consid-
erations in deciding on the penalty. Unlike the first case, these jurors
did not express fear of the defendant or his family; they did, however,
express anger, outrage, and disgust at his family, though these feelings
did not register as mitigation for the defendant. In reviewing the rea-
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sons why these jurors voted for death, it appears again as though once
the threshold of guilt was met, the death penalty was largely a fore-
gone conclusion. Moreover, even when there was disagreement, as
was the case with the single juror who initially voted for life, the jurors
went out of their way to talk about the unity of the jury. As the fe-
male juror quoted above said when asked about the best thing about
the jury: "All were paying attention and willing to listen to each
other. No resentment. I thought we all paid attention to what hap-
pened in the trial phase and the guilt, punishment phase."
The cases discussed thus far comprised all white jurors. We have
seen that mitigation is occasionally mentioned but readily dismissed.
There is sometimes fear of the defendant and especially his family,
while at other times there is anger and resentment. Sometimes the
punishment is discussed in the guilt phase; sometimes it is not. The
two juries were similar in that there was no question of the defen-
dant's guilt in either case. Similarly, the jurors wax eloquently about
the unity of their jury, even when there was apparent disagreement.
Finally, while some of the comments may allude to racial issues, overt
discussions of race were lacking. Do the same patterns hold when
African Americans enter into the mix of the jury? We now turn to
evidence pertaining to that question.
3. First Jury with an African-American Male Juror
The first case with an African-American male juror is a South Caro-
lina case that also had three white male jurors, five white female ju-
rors, and three African-American female jurors. This jury voted for
life for an African-American man convicted of killing a white police
officer. The jurors all agreed on the general circumstances of the
crime. In particular, the defendant had been drinking with a female
friend; the friend called the police; the police showed up; the defen-
dant tried to elude the police by climbing out a back window; the de-
fendant had a gun; and, the police officer who had responded to the
call from the friend died from a gunshot wound. Killing a police of-
ficer qualifies as a capital offense in South Carolina.
A white female juror provided some important context for under-
standing the jurors' guilt and punishment decisions. When she was
asked if there was anything about the case that stuck in her mind or
that she kept thinking about, she responded:
J: We did have a big issue that happened, well to us it was a big
issue. We had two black guys that came in one day and they just
didn't sit down, they stood at the back of the courtroom, and it was
like they were staring at possibly the blacks on the jury. And they
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just stood there. Shortly after that, we went to lunch, there were
three of us jurors in this particular car, and I said, I know we're not
supposed to discuss this case but I said I have a feel of something
that happened, and so the [court agent accompanying them] said
what was it; if you have a feeling, general, you know, and I went on
to explain. I said how, my question to you and the other two jurors
is, did [you] feel the same that I did? And both the other jurors said
yes, we did. And so as soon as we got back after lunch, because our
[court agent] said "I'll take care of it", and so soon as we got back,
these two gentlemen came back in and did the same thing. And by
that time, the judge had been informed, by one [court agent], and
they had been dismissed. But there's always been .... I've never
said it before, or never been part of it before until then, and didn't
ever think about it until then, but I've always heard that black peo-
ple will take care of black people. You know what I mean? And I
got the feeling that they were there to remind this man, he's our
brother, so hold out as long as you can, and damned if he didn't do
it; he's the one that hung us up for so long. Yeah, that's what really
sticks out in my mind.
The black male juror gave the following account of the crime:
J: Sheriff came down to arrest [the defendant]. He was in the
house. Jumped out the window with a shot gun. As he jumped, the
shot gun went off. The gun accidentally went off and shot police
officer around the side of the house.
He went on to say:
J: The other police officers didn't see him do it, that's what I'm
referring to. See, they [were] coming down the hall when the shot
went off; they didn't see him do it, all they heard was shots.
When asked for additional words to describe the killing, his succinct
response was that it "was just an accident."
The white jurors seemed to agree that the crime was not premedi-
tated. As a white female juror said when asked to describe the killing:
J: I don't feel he woke up that day and said I'm going to kill some-
one in the Sheriff's Department. It's just the fact that he didn't
want to be pinned up and he didn't care who got in his way. He was
like an animal that did not want to get pinned up.
Another white female juror echoed this story, but with an expression
of empathy for the defendant and concern that the black male juror
understand her reasoning. Half-way through this juror's description
of the crime she said:
J: Can I tell you my personal feelings here? What I felt all along
was, and I tried to tell the black guy that was on the jury, was that I
do not feel that [the defendant's name] got up that morning with the
intentions, hey, I got up and I'm really going to kill somebody today
premeditated, but I just feel like that he was afraid, he was hemmed
in, and he was scared. He didn't know what to do. And here was
1526 [Vol. 53:1497
CROSSING RACIAL BOUNDARIES
this gun, and where it came from, if it was her's [the woman who
called the police] I do not know. All I know is that I felt he did not
get up that morning and say I am deliberately going to kill some-
body. I just think he got hemmed in, he got scared, and he ran, you
know, he was trying to get away from being caught. I felt sorry for
him. I thought he was a victim of circumstance.
The jurors thus agreed that the killing of the police officer was not a
premeditated event, but the African-American man went one step
further in describing the situation as an accident. These different per-
ceptions of the crime, not surprisingly, emerged in the jury's guilt de-
liberations, though the jurors did not talk about these differences until
they were asked about the penalty deliberations. The third white fe-
male juror who was interviewed came straight to the point in the fol-
lowing exchange:
Q: [I]n your own words, can you tell me what the jury did to reach
its decision about defendant's punishment?
J: We had almost come up with what the sentence was going to be
before we could arrive on the guilty verdict. We had pretty much
decided among ourselves if we gave the guilty verdict that he would
do life imprisonment.
The third (white) woman who was interviewed had this to say about
the punishment decision:
J: One person [a white male juror] thought he should get the death
penalty, he was strongly for it. They all listened to him and then
voiced their own opinion, aloud. Not sure if he gave in or truly
changed his mind. It took two hours to "pull him over," trying to
change his mind. And that's when the other person [the black male
juror] voiced out and said, "that's the reason I didn't want to say he
was guilty." They almost read each other's mind. [The] two men
were polar opposites in the trial, also opposite races.
As to the actual penalty decision, the African-American male juror
explained that a sentence of thirty years without parole was the
compromise:
J: The only way the one [hold-out for death] would vote for life was
30 years without parole. That was the only way he would agree to
giving life .... We gave him the 30 years with no parole and, we
came back out, the prosecuting lawyer tacked on another ten years
for the weapon. So, for having the weapon they gave him another
ten years, and if, me, myself, knew that when we [were] in the jury
room deliberating, I might not have signed this 30 years with no
parole.... The judge told us when we came out of [defendant's
name] case, [if] we'd of took a few more hours, he was going to
declare a hung jury [on sentence] and he was going to give him 20
years. So, but we made a decision before it came to that, 'cause it
took us so long. I'm the one that was holding out, that's why it took
so long to come to a decision on this case. And if we waited that
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much longer, he was going to declare the sentence. I thought 20
years with no parole would be long enough.
The African-American male juror had reservations about the capi-
tal murder conviction and took a stand against the death penalty at
the guilt stage of the trial as a condition for his vote to find the defen-
dant guilty of capital murder. One white female juror acknowledged
that the jury pretty much decided on a life sentence at guilt. Two of
the white female jurors agreed that the crime was not premeditated
and believed for that reason that the defendant should not be exe-
cuted. They did not, however, express any reluctance to vote for guilt
of capital murder as did the African-American male juror. At the
penalty stage, one white male juror advocated the death penalty, but
the black male juror resisted staunchly to the point, he reports, of "be-
ing the one who was holding out, that's why it took so long." It seems
that several of the white jurors performed their duties under a cloud
of suspicion that the black male juror might have been acting under
the influence of other members of his race who appeared in the court-
room, hardly an atmosphere conducive to constructive deliberations
and a "reasoned moral" decision.
4. Second Jury with an African-American Male Juror
The final case to be presented differs from the others in that race
was the ultimate dividing line between votes for life and death. The
three African Americans, one of whom is male, voted for life while
the remaining jurors voted for death. In Florida, where this case was
tried, the jury needed only a majority vote, not unanimity, to make a
sentencing recommendation and the trial judge could reject the jury's
recommendation. The jury recommendation was for death (9-3) as
was the judge's final sentencing decision.
This case is similar to the others presented previously in that the
white jurors saw little mitigation. For instance, a white male juror did
not recognize favorable military service as mitigation even when it
was presented. When asked to describe the defendant, this juror said:
J: He had been a Marine and he had had a lot going for him-he
did well in there. He was even an athlete but I think he didn't like
the authority. He was a professional black. He moaned about his
problems and blamed them on a white society being against a black
male. He should have blamed his problems on his own
shortcomings.
When asked, "What information about the defendant or the crime
would have made you change your mind about what the punishment
should be?," this juror replied: "[A]ny mitigating circumstance; none
were put forth." Thus, the juror recounts circumstances traditionally
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offered in mitigation, only to dismiss them as irrelevant to his punish-
ment decision.
One of the white female jurors acknowledged mitigators, stating
that the jury discussed the defendant's "occasional use of crack co-
caine and alcohol, and could this have affected his behavior." This
juror also hinted at the defense having presented mental health evi-
dence when she said the "[the jury] couldn't believe he was insane
because of his actions afterwards." But in response to structured
questions, she indicated that these factors had no affect on her punish-
ment decision.
The African-American man on the jury agreed with his fellow ju-
rors that the defendant was guilty but disagreed with them on the
presence or importance of mitigation. Indeed, he mentioned several
mitigators. For instance, when asked "what defense evidence or wit-
ness at the punishment stage of the trial was most important or influ-
ential," this juror replied: "The psychiatrist because he said he gave
[the defendant] all of these psychological tests and he failed them."
This juror also mentioned that the defendant "didn't have a chance to,
he never had a fair shake in life" and that the defense attorney argued
that the defendant should not receive a sentence of death "because at
the time he was mentally imbalanced and under the influence of drugs
and alcohol and didn't know what he was doing." Clearly, this black
male juror mentions multiple mitigators and recounts them as legiti-
mate considerations from his perspective.
The fact that Florida does not require a unanimous vote for a jury
punishment recommendation likely contributed to the somewhat
muted penalty deliberations. The foreman of the jury, a white male,
described the process as follows:
J: [I] saw there were disagreements about the death penalty. Some
had already made up their minds that they didn't believe in the
death penalty. That was one of the main topics, it wasn't whether
he deserved it or not but some person had told the attorney that
they were neutral but behind closed doors it was very evident that
no matter what the crime was, they wouldn't recommend death. We
discussed the heinousness, the fact that [the defendant] could have
walked away from the crime, the people standing at the door watch-
ing and him turning back and trying to keep [the victim] quiet; the
seriousness of the crime. None of us could understand why he did
it. I don't think that any minds were changed during the process of
discussing. I think many decisions had been made prior to this by
the time we deliberated, the decisions had been made. I do believe
that I could have swayed some people if I had been more emphatic.
In a telling comment, the foreman goes on to answer a question asking
about areas of disagreement:
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J: We all agreed that he deserved the death penalty but there were
some things that were unsaid, such as some people had no justifia-
ble reason for why death should not be imposed; we had justifiable
reason for imposing death.
The African American man's take on the jury's sentencing delibera-
tion was quite different:
J: In the room with the other jurors, most of the men jumped up
and said this was the work of a mad man, he should get death. A
few of us said no and it went on and on and on. Tempers started
flaring. A few ladies started crying.
The interviewer then asked if there were any other topics discussed, to
which the juror responded:
J: The foreman told us the evidence is before you. We also dis-
cussed the fact that he had the chance to walk out but went back
and repeatedly stabbed her and beat her and strangled her and
there was no reason why he should not get the death penalty. We
voted once or twice. I'm sorry, we voted once the vote was 3 or 4
against death.
When asked directly why he was reluctant to vote for death, this black
male juror's story went to race:
J: I know he was guilty of murder and at the time I thought [the
victim] could have been my mother but at the same time when I
saw, I think there were three jurors who were black, we knew from
tempers flaring that the others wanted the death penalty and [we]
knew why. I kept thinking if this were reversed, if a white man kills
a black old lady, would they be as, in such a rush to kill him? Also,
the taking of a human life will not bring back the life. Some others
in there felt the same.
The interviewer then asked:
I: Do you think race was really an issue?
J: In the jury, yes. It was wrong what he did and it could have been
my mother but I still would have felt the same way against death.
And when he was asked what he thought the strongest factors were
for a life sentence, he said: "To take a life will not replace a life. No
matter how bad the individual is, he can change; I know that for a
fact." This same black juror went on to acknowledge that he thought
of other cases when deciding this case:
Q: In making your punishment decision, did you compare the de-
fendant or his crime to any other murderers or murder cases you
knew about? How did you know or learn about the other cases(s)
or murderer(s)?
J: From watching the news and from reading the newspaper. As a
matter of fact, I don't know if you are familiar with this but we had
a white male kill a woman and her husband and left them in the
woods. The same guy had been on trial several times and they gave
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him life it was a white man. This my belief: If we're going to have a
death penalty, use it on everyone, don't use it, most of the death
penalties carried out are carried out on who? Black males.
This African-American man clearly believed that traditional mitiga-
tors were present in the case and yet his ultimate decision was based
on what he thought was fair from a personal and broader historical
perspective. The white jurors, in contrast, noted but dismissed the
mitigators. They likewise dismissed the views expressed by the Afri-
can-American jurors (facilitated no doubt by Florida's failure to re-
quire unanimity on punishment). The white jurors pointed to the
heinous and senseless nature of the crime as reasons for death. They
could see "no justifiable reasons for life." They disregarded the Afri-
can-American jurors' sense of fairness, as well as indications that
some of the white male jurors were animated for death. This is a case
in which the jurors' backgrounds, their attitudes and beliefs, appear to
have dictated the dynamics of the deliberation. The fact that such
characteristics differed along racial lines should not be surprising, it is
perfectly consistent with the Turner Court's predictions.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In Turner v. Murray,44 the U.S. Supreme Court found a constitu-
tionally unacceptable risk that white jurors' life or death decisions
would be influenced by racist attitudes when a convicted capital de-
fendant is black and his victim is white. The Court observed that
white jurors might be especially inclined to view black defendants as
"violence prone" or "morally inferior," owing to conscious and uncon-
scious racial attitudes. Similarly, the Court's prescient opinion antici-
pated that white jurors may be less sympathetic to evidence of mental
disturbance and that their fear of blacks would make them more likely
to vote for death.45
The Court was right, though the story is nuanced by race and gen-
der. The statistical evidence reveals that white male jurors were far
more likely than African-American male jurors to think of the Afri-
can-American defendant as dangerous to others and far less apt than
their black counterparts to see the defendant as sorry for what he did.
White women were much less likely than black women to acknowl-
edge the defendant's emotional disturbance. Concerning the ten-
dency to identify with the defendant, African-American male jurors
were significantly more likely than others to imagine themselves in the
situation of the defendant's family, to imagine themselves as a mem-
44. 476 U.S 28.
45. See text accompanying supra note 5.
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ber of the defendant's family, to be reminded of someone by the de-
fendant, and less likely than others to see the defendant's family as
different from their own. And, as the Court supposed, the evidence
shows that white jurors of both genders are much less receptive to
arguments and evidence of mitigation than African-American jurors
who served on the same black-defendant/white-victim cases.
The narrative accounts of jurors in B/W cases document subtler
ways in which racial attitudes may infect the decision process. For
example, a white female juror spoke of the jury's fear of retaliation by
the defendant's family as prompting a request for an escort to their
cars at the end of the trial. Another white female juror interpreted
the presence of two African-American males standing at the back of
the courtroom as promoting solidarity among the African-American
jurors. Still another white female juror reacted with fear to an Afri-
can-American defendant sweating on the stand, without wondering
whether his sweat might have reflected his fear. A white male juror
wished to bring the defendant's African-American family to the Lord,
viewing the whole family as depraved because the father had so many
children. One white male juror saw his jury's death sentence in the
black defendant/white victim case as a statement representative of "all
Missourians."
Beyond the influence of race on the thinking of individual jurors is
the specter of its effects on jurors acting as members of a decision-
making group. We have seen in Table 1 that the racial composition of
the jury, more specifically the number of white men and black men on
the jury, strongly affects the sentence imposed in B/W cases. Jurors
in white male-dominated (and all white) juries describe the work of
the jury in terms of unity, agreement, and speaking for all Missouri-
ans. Conspicuous in these white male dominated juries is the lack of
serious discussion of mitigation. Jurors speak of "pep hugs" and ex-
plain the final decision as the lifting of a "fog." In contrast, when
there are African Americans, or at least one African-American male,
on the jury, conflict is evident and mitigation is voiced and considered.
In addition, there is a tendency for the jurors themselves to acknowl-
edge how race colors their perspectives and how the race of other
jurors may do likewise.
These findings point to the decisive failure of the remedy the Court
authorized in Turner. The Court's remedy was to rely upon voir dire
questioning to detect deeply ingrained and often unconscious racial
attitudes. Asking prospective jurors about their racial attitudes was
supposed to provide the tools necessary to rid juries of people whose
decisions are likely to be influenced by race of the defendant or vic-
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tim. But the tools are not working. All of the cases examined here
were tried after Turner became effective. That is not to say that we
know from this study whether or to what extent there was an attempt
to discern prospective jurors' attitudes toward people of the opposite
race. What we do know, however, is that whatever attempts may have
been made thanks to Turner, the risk of racial bias remains all too
manifest.
It is no easy matter to assess the views of people regarding race,
especially in the environs of an open courtroom. People are generally
reluctant to admit that they hold racist attitudes or opinions or even to
acknowledge this to themselves. Researchers find that racially
prejudiced people will consciously attempt to avoid appearing to be
racially biased.46 When asked if they could and would follow the
judge's instructions, they are loath to say "no" in the face of such an
authority figure. Moreover, they have no prior experience in making
a life or death decision so saying whether their racial attitudes will
influence their decision is not merely hypothetical, it is void of the
kind of grounded experience on which someone can make a reliable
inference. When it is acknowledged, as the Turner Court does, that
racial bias may be unconscious as well as conscious, the difficulty is
compounded. Straightforward questioning is hardly an effective tool
for getting at the unconscious. 47 What is more, prosecutors have the
upper hand in shaping the racial composition of juries by ridding them
of minority candidates through the use of peremptory strikes. 48 And,
it is well recognized that the Batson prohibition against the exercise of
peremptory strikes on the basis of race is ineffective in practice.49
46. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y AND L.
201 (2000).
47. As Patricia G. Devine et al. state:
That is, despite disavowing prejudice consciously and responding without prejudice on
easily controllable explicit self-report measures, many people who report being low in
prejudice show bias on responses that are less amenable to control. For example, when
race bias is assessed with implicit measures, which theoretically bypass conscious con-
trol, bias is often observed even among those who claim to be nonprejudiced.
Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of Motiva-
tions To Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 835 (2002) (cita-
tions omitted).
48. See Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and
Emerical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 3 (2001).
49. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 501 (1996) (reviewing reported decisions
of federal and state courts applying Batson between April 30, 1986 (the date of the Batson deci-
sion) and December 31, 1993, and concluding that many of the currently accepted bases for
peremptory challenges, such as economic and geographic criteria, as well as attorneys' subjective
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What does this failure presage about remedying the unacceptable
risk of racial bias in cross-race capital cases? Is there some other way
to assemble a jury of the defendant's peers that will render an unbi-
ased punishment decision? Or is it necessary to restrict the use of the
death penalty in a way that will diminish such a risk, or to abandon its
use in boundary crossing interracial cases, or to abolish it altogether
on account of the more pervasive influence of race in capital punish-
ment? At the time of McCleskey, the Court was unwilling to restrict
the use of the death penalty to only certain kinds of cases, 50 and the
ruling itself appeared to foreclose remedies that looked beyond the
circumstances of the particular case. In McCleskey, the Court cited
case-specific steps, such as change of venue, the requirement that per-
emptory strikes be race-neutral as imposed by Batson, and indeed, the
Turner ruling on voir dire questioning about race in interracial cases,
as the kinds of remedies that would suffice.51 In view of Turner's
failure and the Court's single-minded focus on case-related remedies,
is there another case-specific way to diminish the risk of racial bias in
interracial capital cases?
Affirmative jury selection is one answer. The basic premise of af-
firmative jury selection is that the opposing attorneys decide upon ju-
rors to be included rather than excluded from the jury. After all
jurors have been questioned and challenged for cause, it gives the de-
fense and prosecution the right to include rather than to exclude ju-
rors on a peremptory basis. Instead of evaluating prospective jurors
to identify those they wish most to exclude, the opposing attorneys
would evaluate them to determine the ones they most want included
on the jury. After jurors have been excused for cause, the prosecution
and defense would submit their inclusion lists; the trial judge would
seat all jurors who appear on both lists; and for the remaining unfilled
seats on the jury, the judge would seat persons still on the two lists
according to their priority rankings, alternately seating the highest pri-
judgments, continued to exert a disproportionate negative impact on choosing black and His-
panic jurors).
The Batson doctrine has been rendered so ineffective a tool against racism or sexism
that one jurist has been led to note that Batson and its progeny have proven to be less
an obstacle to discrimination than a roadmap to it (citations omitted). The savvy litiga-
tor can succeed with the most blatant discriminatory purpose by a simple manipulation
of the neutral explanation coupled with a dose of disingenuousness.
Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failure To Meet the Chal-
lenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 Wis. L. Rav. 501, 545.
50. Justice Stevens did advocate restricting the use of the death penalty to only the most
aggravated cases where the Baldus data indicated that the risk of racial bias was less
pronounced.
51. McCleskey v. Kemp, 478 U.S. 282, 308-09 (1987).
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ority juror from the defense and then from the prosecution list until
all twelve seats on the jury have been filled. 52
The mechanics might differ. Some have suggested that affirmative
selection be provided only for the defense, 53 but the fundamental
principle of deciding who should be on rather than who should be off
of the jury is the essential feature. As its advocates have argued, af-
firmative jury selection in cases with minority defendants has a long
common law history and is conspicuously faithful to the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee to the defendant of an impartial "jury of his peers. '54
In the capital sentencing context, they would be persons he believes
would be able to understand and give effect to his evidence and argu-
ments of mitigation. They would be a jury of his peers as well as his
victim's peers.
The fact that African-American capital defendants often fail to
have African-American representation on their juries, that the ab-
sence of an African-American male juror is associated with astonish-
ing differences in sentencing outcomes, and that receptivity to
mitigation differs so greatly between black and white jurors when the
defendant is black and the victim is white, call desperately for a rem-
edy. Affirmative jury selection is no guarantee of even-handed justice
in such cases. As sometimes happens, minority jurors are not even
represented in the venire.55 Moreover, when both black and white
jurors are represented on the jury, there will almost surely be diver-
gent perspectives among the jurors along racial lines in terms of such
critical considerations as lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt,
perceptions of his remorsefulness and future dangerousness rooted as
they are in race-linked perceptions of the crime, the defendant, and
feelings toward the defendant and his family. These divergent per-
spectives are bound to be the source of controversy and sometimes
52. See Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory Chal-
lenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REV., 781, 800-12 (1986); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and
the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
153 (1989); Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury de
Mmedietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777 (1994); Tanya
E. Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, but Is She a Soul Sister? Race-Neutrality and the Ideal
of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327 (1994); Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selec-
tion: A Proposal To Advance Both the Deliberative Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 161; Donna J. Meyer, A New Peremptory Inclusion To Increase Representativeness and Impar-
tiality in Jury Selection, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 251 (1994); HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD
KROOTH, RACE IN THE JURY Box: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN JURY SELECTION (2003).
53. See Meyer, supra note 52.
54. See Ramirez, supra note 52.
55. Arguably, the law should prescribe that, in the trial of cross-race capital crimes, there must
be representatives in the venire from the minority racial group. Peers of the defendant as well as
the victim should be represented.
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antipathy among jurors-sentiments that are not conducive to easy or
fault free decision making.
Yet, the capital sentencing decision, unlike the jury's verdict on
guilt, is not supposed to be a matter of consensus on findings of fact
but a reasoned moral judgment each juror makes individually in light
of all aspects of mitigation as proved to his or her own personal satis-
faction and as weighed against aggravation. 56 Better such decision
making should be stormy and even inconclusive but made by a jury of
the defendant's peers than a smooth and easy decision by a jury that
includes only his victim's peers. A foolproof remedy to racial bias in
interracial capital cases is unavailable, except, of course, for the aban-
donment of the death penalty in such cases. But, short of that, a rem-
edy that enhances the likelihood that a black defendant can also have
African Americans on his jury should at least help to reverse what is
now an outrageous discrepancy in the treatment of defendants in such
racial boundary-crossing cases.
56. See William J. Bowers et al., The Capital Sentencing Decision: Guided Discretion, Rea-
soned Moral Judgment, or Legal Fiction, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCrION
413 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2003).
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APPENDIX
COMPONENTS OF AGGRAVATION AND MITIGATION
RECEPTIVITY SCALES
Matching Pairs of Prosecution Arguments in Aggravation and Jury Sentencing
Considerations
Prosecution Arguments Juror Considerations
The pain and suffering of the victim The pain and suffering of the victim
The brutal or savage character of the The vicious or brutal manner of the
crime killing
The punishment wanted by the The punishment wanted by the
victim's family victim's family
The death penalty will keep the Keeping the defendant from ever
defendant from killing again killing again
The death penalty will deter others Keeping other people from killing
from killing again
The past crimes or violence of the The defendant had a history of violent
defendant crime
The defendant would be a danger to The defendant's potential for
the public if he ever escaped or was dangerousness if ever released back in
released from prison society
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Matching Pairs of Defense Arguments in Mitigation and Jury Sentencing
Considerations
Defense Arguments
The death penalty is not humane
The death penalty is not a superior
deterrent
The risk of mistakenly executing the
wrong person
The defendant 's abuse or
mistreatment as a child
The influence of mental illness on the
defendant
The influence of alcohol on the
defendant
Basic human qualities of the
defendant
That the defendant was sorry or asked
for mercy
Juror Considerations
The desire to avoid deliberately
killing someone
Keeping other people from killinga
Lingering doubts about the
defendant's guilt
The defendant had been seriously
abused as a child
Defendant suffering from extreme
mental or emotional disturbance
The defendant was under the
influence of alcohol
Feelings of mercy or compassion for
the defendant
Defendant did not express any
remorse, regret, or sorrow for the
crimea
The recklessness or provocation of the The victim was a well-known
victim troublemaker
The defendant had become a model
prisoner
The defendant would be a
hardworking, well behaved inmate
a Reverse coded
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